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Recent Developments
State v. Gray

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland in State v.
Gray, 344 Md. 417, 687 A.2d 660
(1997), held that a nontestifying
codefendant's confession does not
violate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront his
accusers when the names of others
implicated in the crime are deleted,
and when the jury is instructed to
consider the confession only with
respect to the guilt of the confessing codefendant. In its five to
two opinion, the court placed great
faith in the ability of juries to
dichotomize evidence and to draw
no impennissible conclusions from
the deleted inferences.
Stacey Williams was beaten by
a group of six men and died as a
result of his injuries. Incident to
an investigation, Anthony Bell
("Bell") was arrested and confessed to the murder, implicating
himself, Jacquin Vanlandingham
("Jacquin"), and Kevin Dominic
Gray ("Gray"). The court denied
Gray's motions to sever his trial
from Bell's or in the alternative to
exclude Bell's confession from
evidence. The trial court ordered
the redaction of Jacquin's and
Gray's names from the confession
and instructed the jury to consider
the evidence only against Bell.
Although there was conflicting
evidence regarding Gray's exact
location at the time of the incident,
the jury convicted Gray of involuntary manslaughter. The court
sentenced him to ten years
imprisonment.
Gray appealed and argued that
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the redacted confession was a
violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to cross-examine his accusers. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland agreed and
reversed the lower court. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari.
Citing the Sixth Amendment,
the court began its analysis by
noting that in criminal trials, both
federal and state, a defendant has
the right to confront his or her
accusers. Gray, 344 Md. at 420,
687 A.2d at 662 (citing U.s.
CONST. amend. VI). The ability to
confront implies the right to crossexamine. Id. (citing Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07
(1965».
Next, the court summarized the history of Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the issue of
admitting a nontestifying codefendant's confession. Gray at
420-27,687 A.2d at 662-666.
Initially, the Supreme Court
held that it is possible for a jury to
follow instructions, and limit a
confession solely to the determination of the guilt of the confessing codefendant. Id. at 421,
687 A.2d at 662-63 (citing Bruton

v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 at
126 (1968». In Bruton, the Court
departed from this view holding
that, notwithstanding a jury instruction, a confession of a
nontestifying
codefendant
implicating a defendant by name
violates the defendant's right to
cross-examine the witness. Gray
at 421, 687 A.2d at 663 (citing
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126). The
Bruton ruling, the court continued,
illustrated the Court's concern that
despite instructions "such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be
wiped from the brains of the
jurors." Gray at 421,687 A.2d at
663, (quoting Paoli v. United
States, 352 U.S. 232, 247-48
(1957». While acknowledging the
judicial economy joint trials
afford, the probative value of a
confession and the integrity of the
jury system, the Bruton Court held
that jury instructions are not an
"adequate substitute" for the constitutional
right
to
crossexamination. Gray at 422-23, 687
A.2d at 663.
The practice of redacting the
names of others implicated in the
confession was challenged in
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S.
200 (1987). Gray at 423, 687
Marsh limited
A.2d at 663.
Bruton and held it to be a "narrow
exception" to the presumption that
juries will follow instructions
accurately. Gray at 424-425,687
A.2d at 664. There is a distinction,
the Court held, between confessions directly implicating codefendants and confessions where
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a codefendant's guilt is inferred.
Id. at 426, 687 A.2d at 665,
(citting Marsh, 481 U.S. at 208).
In the latter case, an instruction
can be adequate to dissuade juries
from making the inference. Id. at
426, 687 A.2d at 665 (citing
Marsh 481 U.S. at 208). In
addition, the Marsh Court held that
judicial economy and the advantage of consistent verdicts in
joint trials warrant the admissibility of confessions where a
codefendant is not named. Gray at
426, 687 A.2d at 665 (citing
Marsh 481 U.S. at 208-210).
Marsh, however, did not rule
on the issue of the admissibility of
a confession where the codefendants' names are redacted.
Gray at 426, 687 A.2d at 665.
Currently, the Maryland court
continued, there is a considerable
split among the circuits regarding
the issue reserved in Marsh. Gray
at 426, 687 A.2d at 665. Some
courts have held that if a codefendant's confession tends to
incriminate a defendant, when
used in light of other evidence
presented, it creates a substantial
risk that the jury will improperly
use the confession to determine the
defendant's culpability. Id. at 427,
687 A.2d at 665. Other jurisdictions have held that a confession is
admissible if it does not implicate
the defendant by name, or if the
defendant's name is deleted from
the confession. Id. at 427, 687
A.2d at 665-666.
The Maryland court rejected
both approaches holding that the
former undermined the long held
presumption that juries will follow
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instructions faithfully. Id. at 427428, 687 A.2d at 666. The latter
approach is equally flawed, the
court stated, because in some
cases, notwithstanding instructions, juries might still conclude
that the deleted name is that of the
defendant. Id. at 428, 687 A.2d at
666. Sometimes the inferential
step that juries must make to link
the defendant is so small that it is
effectively nonexistent. Id. at 428,
687 A.2d at 666.
In suggesting a third approach,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland
first reaffirmed the presumption
that juries will follow instructions
and will resist impermissible inferences. Id. at 429, 687 A.2d at 667.
There are those cases, however,
where such inference is so compelling that jurors will be unable to
follow the court's instruction. Id.
at 429,687 A.2d at 666-67 (citing
United States v. Pendegraph, 791
F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1991)
(though the codefendant's confession was redacted, the jury could
infer that the defendant was the
accomplice simply because there
was no other possibility)). Therefore, the court concluded, in order
to overcome the presumption that
jurors will ignore or will be unable
to follow court instructions, the
urge to make the unauthorized
deduction must be "compelling,
inevitable and subject to little or
no debate." Id. at 430, 687 A.2d at
667.
Turning to the facts of the
instant case, the court reviewed
Bell's confession and noted that he
identified three of the six participants. Id. at 431,687 A.2d at 667-

668. Although the jury could have
inferred from the testimony that
one of the three unidentified
persons was Gray, Bell's confession did not compel such an
inference. Id. at 432, 687 A.2d at
668. Therefore, the strong presumption that the jury will follow
the court's instructions was not
overcome and a Bruton violation
did not occur. Id. at 434, 687 A.2d
at 669. The defense's argument
that the jury might make the inference was insufficient. Id.
All dangers of hearsay are
present in a nontestifying codefendant's confession: (1) erroneous memory; (2) faulty perception; (3) insincerity; and (4) ambiguity. The judicial economy
afforded by joint trials in an overburdened legal system is nevertheless critical. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland in Gray thoughtfully
balanced all conflicting interests
and arrived at the best holding
possible under the circumstances.

